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Facts, Fallacies, and California's Three Strikes
FranklinE. Zimring and Sam Kamin*
The Duquesne Law Review recently published an article by Brian
Janiskee and Edward Erler I that contains a number of strong
criticisms of a study we conducted on the impact of California's
Three Strikes and You're Out legislation on crime and punishment
in California. 2 In particular, four of these criticisms require a reply
from us because they combine substantial misunderstanding of our
research methodology with insinuations about the honesty and
competence of the authors of the study. In addition to these
methodological differences, we also object to two demonstrably
false statements about the content of the report. Finally, we
discuss the aspect of the critique that we find to be the most
disturbing - namely, its distaste for what it purports to be, an
empirical analysis of criminal justice policy. Each of these topics
will be discussed after a brief summary of our study's findings.
I.

THE THREE STRIKES DETERRENCE STUDY

In the Crime & Punishment monograph, we used two methods
to assess the impact of the Three Strikes law, passed by the
California legislature and signed into law in March 1994, on crime
rates. First, we analyzed seasonally adjusted monthly crime levels
for nine major California cities from 1990 through 1996 - in other
words, from 50 months before Three Strikes became law to 33
months after the law went into effect. We concluded that this
monthly crime data did not clearly indicate a deterrent effect
attributable to the 1994 law. While crime rates did decline after
March of 1994, we observed that the crime rate had actually started
to decline 17 months prior to the enactment of the Three Strikes
legislation, and the slope of the decline did not change appreciably
* Gordon Hawkins was unable to participate in this response.
1. Brian P Janiskee and Edward J. Erler, Crime Punishment, and Romero: An
Analysis of the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law, 39 DuQ. L REv. 43 (2000).
2.

ZIMRING ET AL, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN CALFoRNA THE IMPACT OF THREE STRIKES AND

YOU'RE OUT (Institute of Governmental Studies Press 1999). The study discussed in that
article had since been expanded into a book: PUNISHMENT AND DEMocRAcy: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (Oxford University Press 2001).
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after March of 1994.3 In other words, crime was dropping in
California before Three Strikes went into effect and continued to
drop at the same rate after the law went into effect.
We then analyzed the specific terms of the 1994 legislation to
create a more refined test of deterrence. Three Strikes changed the
penalties for two defendants with one or two prior strikes;
however, penalties for defendants without strikes on their record
remained the same as before. Thus, it can be expected that the
deterrent effect of the new legislation will be greatest on those
defendants with prior strikes on their record. If this were true, we
should expect to find fewer repeat offenders in the offending
population after the law went into effect than we did before the
law went into effect. In order to test this hypothesis, we sampled
data from of several thousand arrests occurring before and after
the new law in three California cities, and analyzed and coded the
criminal records of the defendants.
This study produced three significant findings on deterrence.
First, the maximum percentage reduction in crime rate achievable
by targeting the "strike groups" was smaller than we thought. That
is, based on the data collected, persons eligible for a third strike
sentence were responsible for about 3.3% of California urban felony
arrests before Three Strikes, and the second strike group was
responsible for an additional 7.3%. Therefore, we concluded, if all
crime by these offenders ceased, the resultant reduction in crime
rate would be just over 10%.
The second finding was that the share of arrests attributable to
the second strike group did not change when pre-and post-Three
Strikes samples were compared. In other words, those eligible for
second strike punishment under the 1994 law made essentially the
same contribution to California crime after the law's passage as
they did before.
The third finding was that those eligible for the most serious
sentences, the third strike group, declined from only 3.3% of all
arrests to 2.7% of arrests.
In generalizing the results of our three-city study to the state as a
whole, we found that the Three Strikes law reduced California
crime by only six-tenths of one percent. This contradicts the claim
,by California's Attorney General that the drop in crime during the
"Three Strikes Era" was over 30%. In fact, our final estimate of the
deterrent effect in the monograph under review was between zero
3.

ZHmUNG gT A., supra note 2, at 86.
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4
and 2% of California crime.

II. THE JANISKEE/ERLER CRITICISMS
The article we are responding to made four purportedly
methodological criticisms of our study. The first of these was that
we should not have been studying deterrence:
The principal conclusion of Zimring is that the Three Strikes
legislation fails to provide any measurable deterrent effect on
the target groups. In coming to this conclusion, Zimring
violates the first principle of policy analysis - that any law or
policy must be understood in terms of its intent. It is a
palpable fact that the California legislature did not intend the
principal purpose of the law to be deterrence, but rather "to
ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment of
those who commit a felony and have been previously
5
convicted of serious and/or violent offenses."
However, this criticism fails to comprehend that our study did in6
fact analyze short-term incapacitation in addition to deterrence.
Furthermore, while our critics are correct in stating that the Three
Strikes law was originally justified on the basis of incapacitation,
they fail to mention that after the law was passed, claims that
declining crime rates were the result of Three Strikes deterrence
proliferated. 7 Indeed, even Janiskee and Erler allude to the
deterrent power of the Three Strikes legislation in their critique of
our study.8 This attempt to have things both ways, that is, to claim
a deterrent effect while at the same time objecting to our focus on
claims of deterrence, is internally inconsistent.
The second assault on our methodology alleges that "the study
derives from the statistical conflation of arrests and crime."9 Our
study assumes that the three different groups of offenders (those
with zero, one, and two or more strikes) face the same chance of
arrest per 100 crimes committed. That is, we deduce from the fact
that 7% of those arrested have one strike on their records that 7%
4.

Id. at 66.

5. Janiskee and Erler, supm note 1, at 50.
6. ZmlNG gr AL, supra note 2, at 72-75 (discussing the three different ways in which
the Three Strikes law could have an incapacitative effect on those eligible for the law's
increased sanctions, and arguing that none of these theories are-supported by the relevant
crime and imprisonment data).
7.

Id. at 66-67.

8. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 50-54.
9.

Id. at 49.
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of crime in the general population is committed by members of this
10
group.
Two problems with this assumption are suggested. First, Janiskee
and Erler believe that the arrest rate per 100 crimes committed will
be higher for second and third strike eligible defendants." We do
not think this is true, but if it were the case, it would further
decrease the share of crime that these special target groups commit
and thus further decrease the potential crime saving of a Three
Strikes program. If the odds of being caught were twice as high for
third strike eligible defendants than for those without any strikes
on their record, their 3.3% share of all arrests in April of 1993
would be evidence that they committed only 1.7% of California
crime during that period. Thus, even if our assumption that arrest
rates are a good proxy for commission rates is inaccurate - and
we do not believe that it is - this would only strengthen the case
against Three Strikes as a major crime prevention tool.
The second objection about what our critics call "conflation" is
that some of the criminal offenses for which post-Three Strikes
arrests occurred might have been for crimes committed before the
new law went into effect. The authors assert that "[ilt is not
uncommon for an arrest to occur many months - even years 2
after the fact," without any citation to any authority or statistics.
While some robberies, burglaries, and larcenies that occurred
before April 1 may lead to April arrests, the precipitating event that
produces an arrest is almost always a recent crime.'3 The bias that
10. ZIMRiNG gr AL, supra note 2, at 41-43.
11. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 49.
12. Id.
13. There are three reasons why the overwelming majority of arrests are the product of
criminal acts quite proximate to the date of arrest. First, the overwhelming majority of
felony arrests are for offenses at the low end of the seriousness scale. In the United States,
there were 1,166,362 arrests for larceny in the United States compared to 13,277 for murder,
a ratio of 88.2 to one. The ratio of drug arrests to murder arrests was 119.4 to one for year
2000 (see F&I UCR 2000 at pp. 216). This bottom-heavy pattern is also found for the arrests
that make suspects eligible for second and third strike treatment in the 1994 and 1995
samples (see Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001 at Chapter 4). For crimes of low
seriousness, there is no incentive for sustained investigation. Arrest is a same-day
phenomenon.
The second evidence of minimum time lag between crime commission and arrest is the
fact that most arrests are made not by detectives, who are responsible for investigation, but
by patrol officers (see e.g. Indianapolis Police Department Annual Report for 2000). A patrol
officer only makes arrests he or she happens across. The time lag in this majority of cases is
zero.
The third piece of evidence on the short time between crime and arrest concerns the
effort and attention span of detectives. In The Criminal InvestigationProcess, Jan Chaiken,
Peter Greenwood, and Joan Petersilia report that for Pittsburgh detectives, the average case
file is active for only 3.8 days before investigative effort is suspended (Chaiken, Greenwood,
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could result if second and third strike offenders were arrested after
April 1 of 1994 solely for offenses committed prior to March 8
(when the Three Strikes law went into effect) would be that the
percentage of targeted groups in the arrest population would be
higher than the percentage of criminal acts committed by the
targeted groups after the new law went into effect. The reason we
doubt that this happened is that the percentage of arrests for both
the second and third strike groups was the same in the second
month of Three Strikes (April 1994) as it was in the 14th month
after the law took effect (April 1995).14 If there were persons
arrested for crimes committed before March 8, 1994, we would
expect this group to be found in the April 1994 sample, but not the
April 1995 sample, resulting in a higher proportion of second and
third-strike defendants in the April 1994 sample. However, as we
15
report in the monograph, this was simply not what was observed.
The third major complaint about the study is that we sampled for
deterrent impact too early in the career of the Three Strikes law:
One of the most obvious defects in the research design is the
inexact placement of the longitudinal samples. The Three
Strikes law went into effect in March 1994. Zimring took the
first post-Three Strikes sample from April 1994, only one
month after the effective date of the legislation and the second
sample from April 1995.... By taking samples so soon after
the law went into effect, Zimring set the bar unreasonably
high for judging the success or failure of Three Strikes. The
study seems therefore to be designed to show no effect for the
new law - otherwise, how can this unorthodox research
16
design be explained?
In making this criticism, the authors cite no research literature on
general deterrence. In fact, the literature on deterrence suggests
that because publicity and public concern are generally at their
maximum around the time of legal change, the closer the
observation to the change, the greater the chance that the effect of
the legal change will be detected.
One wonderful example of this phenomenon was reported in H.
and Petersilia, 1977 at Table 8.7, p. 118). There are, of course, exceptions to the rule in
crimes of high seriousness. And detectives will often clear up a host of old offenses when
they clear a new crime. But as long as the new crime is a few days old, there is no
"conflation" on that account.
14. ZIMRING ET AL, supra note 2, at 78.
15. Id.
16. "Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 47.
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Lawrence Ross's Law, Science and Accidents, in which Ross
demonstrated that the maximum deterrent impact of the British
17
Road Safety Act happened just prior to its effective date.
Furthermore, it has been, shown that well-publicized
counter-deterrent changes like police strikes also have relatively
immediate effects, presumably because publicity is greatest at or
prior to the onset of such occurrences. 8 Thus, the timing of our
two large samples was not only orthodox by the standards of
deterrence research, but in fact, demanded by convention. 9
The authors also imply that "the results would have been
different had the samples been taken in 1997 or 1998." 20 Do they
mean that third strike eligible defendants are now significantly less
than 2.7% of total California felony arrests and second strike
eligible significantly less than 5.5%? That is the only way a more
current sample would provide empirical evidence of delayed impact
general deterrence. Given the surprisingly low contribution of the
two-and three-strike offenders to California crime before the law
went into effect, it is only if these groups had severely curtailed
their criminal participation by the late 1990's that a greater
deterrent effect could possibly have been found. The aggregate
crime data Janiskee and Erler want us to consult tell us nothing on
this question, only a replication of our design could answer that
question.
A fourth innuendo-laden criticism relates not to the database we
created for the monograph, but to our use of pre-existing crime
and imprisonment data in the early part of the study. The three
sentences that discuss these issues defy paraphrasing and are
therefore reproduced in their entirety:
It is a further matter of curiosity that Zimring, in a piece
entitled Crime and Punishment in California,did not collect
a single datum that was statewide in scope. In constructing a
figure that represented statewide criminal activity, Zimring
used data only from the ten most populous cities and
discontinued the analysis in 1996 even though the data was
17. H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of
1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUDI.s 1 (1973). See also, MALCOLM M. FEELEY AND SAM KAMN, The Effect of
"Three Strikes and You're Out" on the Courts: Looking Back to See the Future, in THREE
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT, VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POuCY (1996) (arguing that a law will be
applied most literally in the time shortly after its passage).
18. See ZIMRING AND HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 167-70 (1973).
19. We expect that we would have been vulnerable to well-informed methodological
criticism if we had done anything else.
20. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 47.
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available for 1997-98. One is left to wonder whether the data
from 1997-98, if included in their time series, might have
proved embarrassing to the Zimring thesis, as our figures
indicate they might have.21
The reason for our use of big city crime data rather than
statewide data was clearly stated in the monograph,2 and the limits
of using statewide data are unfortunately illustrated by Janiskee
and Erler's analysis in their critique. Statewide data, such as the
annual aggregations Janiskee and Erler use to criticize our work,?3
lump huge time periods together in the nation's largest state, and is
not available in monthly totals. However, the data for large
California cities was available for these shorter periods. Our
analysis involved 84 monthly totals from the beginning of 1990 until
the end of 1996.24 As described above, this month-by-month
tracking showed a downturn that started after October of 1991 and
continues at about the same slope for 62 intervals including 33
months after the Three Strikes law went into effect. Could 1997
and 1998 have altered the inconclusive nature of the interrupted
time series? The authors state that we admit that "properly
cautious interrupted time series analysis would require a distinct
and sharp downward slope in crime rate proximate to the new
penal regime."25 But 1997 and 1998, the years they complain were
missing, were far removed from the legal change. While our critics
attribute a nefarious purpose to our exclusion of the 1997 and 1998
data from the analysis, it is hard for us to conceive of an effect
during those years that could be fairly attributed to the law passed
back in early 1994.
The authors' analysis of homicide rates is a good example of the
problems with annual aggregations. The authors compare the
average year-to-year percentage change for two pre-Three Strikes
years and four post-Three Strikes years.26 Having adopted a data set
that can tell us nothing about the time frame just before and just
after the new law, they then use an averaging technique that counts
declines in 1998 just as clear as a Three Strikes response as 1995
patterns. 27 The formula they use is not a method of discerning time
21. Id. at 54.
22. ZMIMNG Er AL, supra note 2, at 67.
23. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 52-54.
24. ZrMRMG gr AL, supra note 2, at 67-71.
25. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 54 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 52-54. They should of course discard all of 1994 in this analysis because it
combines both pre-and post-periods.
27. Id.
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trends, but instead a method of rendering them non-visible. By
contrast, we were able to carefully investigate trends in the data
because we chose to utilize a database of 84 different periods
rather than 2.2
I.

SOME NON-FACTS

Up to this point, we have focused on the differences in
methodology of us and the authors of Crime, Punishment, and
Romero. In this brief section, we must mention two factual
misstatements that we believe cannot fairly be attributed to a
difference of opinion.
The most striking misstatement is on page 45 of Janiskee and
Erler's critique: "The study also makes the almost incredible
discovery that the law had a statistically meaningless impact on
29
criminal sentences."
The statement is demonstrably false. An entire chapter of the
report (Chapter 3) details the impact of the law on criminal
sentences, both statewide and in the large samples the study
constructed. 30 What we in fact show in Chapter 3 is the following.
Ninety percent of all sentences under the Three Strikes law were
meted out to second strike offenders where plea bargaining can
reduce the severity of the second-strike crime prior to the required
doubling of the nominal sentence.3' We found that there are
increases in these second strike punishments - just not anything
near the doubling that a literal application of the law would
generate.32 Turning to the third strike defendants, all of whom
should have received a sentence of 25-years-to-life if convicted of
any felony, we found that although they constituted approximately
30% of all defendants in the second and third strike pools, they
account for only 10% of the sentences actually meted out under the
new law.3 Based on our analysis, we concluded that while the
sentences for second and third strike offenders increased in the
aggregate, as few as one in ten of those who appear eligible for the
full-force of the Three Strikes' penalty actually received it.3 4
28. ZIMRING gr AL, supra note 2, at 67-71.
29. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 45.
30. ZIMRING Err AL, supra note 2, at 41-63.
31. Under California's Three Strikes law, the punishment for a second strike is double
what it would be for a zero strike offender. The punishment for a third strike is twenty-five
years to life regardless of the triggering felony.
32. ZIMRING Er AL, supra note 2, at 42.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 44-63.
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A second misstatement appears in the first paragraph of the
article where readers are told, "[t]he thesis of the study is that
California's Three Strikes law has failed to deter crime."35 The
problem here is quite simply that the failure of general deterrence
is neither the thesis of the study nor one of its conclusions.
Instead, the study employs sensitive designs for detecting
deterrence and, after analyzing the data, comes to very different
conclusions for the second strike and third strike groups. For the
second strike group, there is no evidence of any marginal deterrent
effect attributable to the 1994 Three Strikes penalty increments the proportion of second-strike offenders in the criminal population
after the law goes into effect is not significantly different than the
proportion of those offenders in the population before the law goes
into effect. For the third strike group, we found statistical evidence
of deterrence, even though we conclude that its total impact on
California crime is quite small.36 Furthermore, we found a large gap
between the official claims for crime reduction and the aggregate
possible deterrence. We are perplexed at how an article devoted to
critiquing a deterrence study can misstate that study's principal
statistical findings.

IV. A

DISTASTE FOR ANALYSIS

Notwithstanding the problems with the Janiskee and Erler
analysis described above, perhaps the most troubling aspect of
their critique is its clear distaste for empirical analysis of the
criminal justice system. This aversion to research is most clear in
the second paragraph of their article: "The underlying assumption
of this study - and all similar statistical studies - is that the
abstract world of probability is more reliable as a basis for public
policy than experience and common sense."37 However, we did
what the authors urged: we observed real world events and applied
common sense analytical tools to those events. Our analysis is
based not on "the abstract world of probability" but on the creation
of a database of actual cases, a close reading and coding of the
facts of those cases, and a comparison of conditions before and
after the law went into effect.
Most disturbing to us, however, is the deep skepticism of
empirical research generally that is revealed by the quotation
above. Janiskee and Erler seemingly urge us to leave well enough
35. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 43.
36. ZMING FT AL, supra note 2, at 79-81.
37. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 43.
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alone because Three Strikes is working, and imply that only a cynic
or someone with an axe to grind could think otherwise. Thus, the
fact that they have mischaracterized our methods is hardly
surprising: no empirical methodology could satisfy them. They state
quite clearly that "all similar statistical studies" are a poor
substitute for intuition. Thus, it seems that the problem is not with
the way in which we are attempting to resolve the issues we have
tackled, but that we have even asked the questions in the first
place.3 8
This anti-empirical viewpoint is particularly disturbing given that
it is also the official position of the state of California. In 1999,
Gray Davis, the democratic governor of California, vetoed a bill
that would have funded an empirical study of Three Strike's impact.
In doing so, the governor essentially argued that state funds should
not be spent to investigate a law that was so clearly functioning as
it was intended to.39
V.

CONCLUSION

The monograph discussed in Crime, Punishment and Romero,
and the larger book based on that study, are part of a substhntial
body of literature about issues of deterrence, incapacitation, and
public policy. Unfortunately, the critique to which we are
responding both fails to comprehend that literature, and does little
to contribute to the scholarship in this area.

38. In our later study, we refer to ourselves and others who have dared to question the
orthodoxy of Three Strikes in California as heretics:
[Djoubts about Three Strikes are not resented because they may lead to political
difficulties; they are in and of themselves a denial of the normative beliefs that
supporters hold. It is the heresy itself rather than what further harm it might
accomplish that provokes anger of Three Strikes supporters.
ZMMRING Er L, PuNtsmENT AND DEmocRAcy, supra note 2, at 222. It seems to us that the
response of Janiskee and Erler is the response of those who have had their orthodoxy
challenged.
39. Id. at 222.

